There are various types of relationships at the level of international engagement, including joint cooperation, whether bilateral or collective, depending on the nature of the interest, its timing, and its context. Consequently, it is classified as tactical, immediate, transitional, short-term, medium-term, or long-term.
At that point, meaning beyond long-term cooperation, cooperation transitions into an alliance, which comprises several types: some are related to shared or permanent interests, while others pertain to fate or existence, the latter operating on an unseen level.
The Saudi relationship with America falls within this last classification, namely, an existential alliance on an unseen level, regardless of certain attempts made by Saudi Arabia at the regional level and across Islamic nations through direct and indirect, military and non-military interventions, and support for extremist groups. In doing so, Saudi Arabia sought to position itself as the primary influential power in the Islamic world, at least within the Sunni domain. However, it failed in this effort due to the emergence of Qatar, which supported the Muslim Brotherhood and certain factions that displeased Saudi Arabia, and the rise of Turkey led by the Justice and Development Party, which harbored dreams of restoring religious authority stretching across Islamic states as an extension of the Ottoman Empire.
Considering the regional dynamics, including ISIS, which had lost much of its strength and influence in Iraq, giving observers the impression that a regulating mechanism still existed to relatively hold the country together, as well as the Syrian scene, which had regained some of its strength through a relatively reliable alliance with Russia and Iran toward Iraq and Syria.
This forced America to be more serious in fighting ISIS through an international coalition under its leadership. Even so, considering America’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, it remains a relationship of funds, jobs, and investments, as made clear in Trump’s direct statements.
And there is nothing better than creating a permanent enemy in the region for the people of the region. For this reason, Saudi Arabia has ranked first in the world in military spending since 1991, that is, from the period following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait up to this moment, alongside US military bases, a US fleet in the Gulf, and the largest US military base in the Middle East in Qatar.
All these factors send messages that this alliance has brought nothing new to the level of Saudi-US relations, and that the involvement of parties from the Islamic and Arab worlds may be a reason for its failure rather than its success; this is the first.
Secondly, Iran is safe from any military action on the foreseeable level, at least, though it may face stringent US sanctions, which Iran can counter through its other channels of engagement with Russia, Turkey, and Europe. Europe has indicated a curtailment of America’s role in the region and a reshaping of its relations, as seen with Britain as well as France, whose new president expressed in his official speech his readiness to develop relations with Iran and his keenness to monitor the implementation of the nuclear agreement.
As for Iraq, it is the state that serves as the arena for settling scores for this entire international system according to the laws of the balance of power, unless it effectively manages its foreign affairs file by building a strategy for external engagement regarding alliances—which it has not managed well to date, rendering it the weakest party as an unreliable and untrustworthy player. Consequently, this has enabled those powers to win over factions within the authority according to their respective agendas, acting on the principle that "what cannot be wholly attained must not be wholly abandoned."