On September 20, 2026, we met with the Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi on the eve of his departure to New York to participate in the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, in addition to meeting with the Presidency's Advisory Board, the Council of Advisors, and a select group of researchers.
We concluded that the most prominent gap in the Prime Minister's speech, which was notably precise and candid, lies in the distance between the discourse and the actual institutional tools capable of translating it into measurable results. We documented several decisions resulting from the meeting, as well as a broader vision regarding planning and institutional organization that we had presented prior to the official gathering.
The meeting convened at a highly sensitive regional moment. It was preceded by an hour-long emergency meeting held by the Prime Minister to monitor the rapid escalation in the region and its direct repercussions on Iraq, specifically the Strait of Hormuz crisis. Since its outbreak in late February 2026 following the US-Israeli military confrontation with Iran, this crisis has represented one of the most pressing energy security issues at both the Iraqi and regional levels. Recent field data from mid-September reveals a sharp decline in navigation through the strait; on one particular day, only four commercial ships transited, compared to a standard average of approximately 125 daily transits prior to the outbreak of the war.
Immediately following the meeting, the Prime Minister departed for New York to participate in the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. This visit comes as a direct extension of an intensive diplomatic tour Al-Zaidi undertook in recent months, covering Tehran, Washington, Paris, and Berlin. In almost every instance, the repercussions of the regional security file overshadowed the announced economic agenda. This was evident during his recent visit to the German capital, when the German Chancellor confirmed that the focal point of the discussions was the difficult situation in the region and Iran's role in the ongoing escalation.
This synchronization between a domestic meeting with the research community and a high-level international engagement subjects the Prime Minister's discourse to a dual test: the coherence of the domestic narrative regarding the management of the economic crisis, and the extent to which it reflects on the diplomatic and negotiating stance he will carry to New York concerning the Hormuz file and regional stability.
A Government Managing a Fire It Did Not Start
The Prime Minister dedicated a part of his remarks to characterizing the kind of crises his government inherited from previous administrations, in an effort to frame current challenges within a long-term cumulative context rather than as a direct product of his policies. This rhetoric, while familiar in the literature of transitional governance, carries added significance when heard directly from him; it is an attempt to establish a preemptive explanatory framework for any subsequent assessment of the government's performance, just as it is a realistic depiction of the magnitude of imbalances accumulated over two decades.
The Budget and Resource Management
The axis of the budget and public resource management constituted the most telling part of the presentation. The Prime Minister described the management style of successive Iraqi budgets, including the performance of the Ministry of Finance, as being closer to the behavior of a "taxi driver" than to planned institutional management—meaning an entity that receives revenues and redistributes them with a daily operational logic, devoid of investment vision or medium- and long-term planning. This characterization, issued by the head of the executive branch himself, represents a striking implicit acknowledgement of the depth of the structural flaw in the state's financial apparatus, transcending the usual rhetoric that tends to lay the blame solely on external or circumstantial factors.
Critical Figures
The most specific segment of the meeting came in the form of figures, outlining resources offset by a massive public sector and pension bloc reaching approximately 8 million employees and retirees, coupled with a significant deficit in the general budget. This ratio between the volume of resources and the size of the human mass dependent on government spending encapsulates the core of Iraq's structural financial crisis: a single-source rentier economy counterbalanced by a functionally bloated state apparatus that exceeds the capacity of available resources to absorb it sustainably.
The solution proposed by the Prime Minister for this imbalance involves a gradual transition from the public sector to the private sector as the primary employer of the workforce. He explicitly acknowledged that this path is "difficult and requires work," functioning more as an admission of the structural, political, and social resistance expected for any reform of this nature, rather than an announcement of a time-bound executive roadmap.
$100 Billion and Three Arms
The Prime Minister reintroduced the Development Fund project, which features bank contributions and a capital of $100 billion. This project had been publicly announced on previous occasions, with contributions from the Central Bank and public subscription, in addition to international and regional financing institutions. It is part of a drive to build an investment platform aimed at financing infrastructure projects, creating jobs, and diversifying growth sources away from the traditional reliance on oil rentierism.
The novel element in this meeting's presentation was the internal detailing of the fund. According to his direct remarks during the discussion, he divided it into three sectoral arms: educational, health, and agricultural. This detail lends the project a broader socio-developmental character, rather than just a purely investment tool, although it still lacks precise governance details and executive mechanisms.
The Narrative of the Undeclared Blockade
Among the most politically significant points raised by Al-Zaidi was the existence of what he described as a blockade similar in impact to the one imposed on Iraq in the 1990s. The fundamental difference, according to his description, is that the previous blockade was declared and institutional, whereas the current one is undeclared.
This characterization carries a dual explanatory dimension. On the one hand, it points to actual restrictions exerted on the Iraqi economy through informal channels (banking sanctions, currency transfer restrictions, and geopolitical pressures tied to the US-Iranian balance within Iraq). On the other hand, it functionally serves to explain the limited government performance through an external factor that is difficult to accurately measure or refute, unlike the previously declared blockade, which was subject to documentation and evaluation by specific criteria.
A Reading of the Iraqi Future
In a striking paradox, the Prime Minister went as far as describing "Iraq's past as being better than its future," a phrase that, from an analytical perspective, can be characterized as a pessimistic vision originating from the head of the executive branch himself.
He added that "our countries", in a broader reference to the states of the region and perhaps even the Global South, have become a burden on the world, and that developed nations are the primary beneficiaries of these countries, not the reverse. This proposition necessitates a careful critical reading. On one hand, it reflects genuine frustration with the limited maneuvering room available to a government managing a rentier economy in a highly volatile regional environment. On the other hand, it carries rhetorical risks when issued by an executive official in a decision-making position, as it could be interpreted as a sign of declining confidence in the possibility of internal reform. This ostensibly contradicts the relatively optimistic presentation of projects such as the Development Fund.
Inability to Produce and Manufacture
Complementing the discussions and the self-critical reading, the Prime Minister acknowledged the inability of successive governments—implicitly including his own—to achieve any real industrial transformation or productive development outside the rentier sector. This acknowledgement is in line with the earlier "taxi driver" point, affirming that the core of Iraq's economic crisis is not a lack of resources as much as it is the absence of an institutional productive planning structure capable of transforming oil rent into a sustainable industrial and agricultural base.
Decisions and Institutional Outcomes
The meeting yielded a set of concrete decisions concerning support for the research infrastructure in Iraq:
First: Establishing a fund to finance study and research centers, provided this funding is subject to the oversight of the Federal Board of Supreme Audit, ensuring a degree of transparency and accountability in resource distribution.
Second: Classifying study centers, particularly university-affiliated ones, into A-B-C categories in a move aimed at distinguishing the quality of research performance and linking funding and institutional support to clear classification criteria.
Third: Allocating spaces within universities for study and research centers, while incentivizing cooperation between them and other research centers in Iraq.
On the sidelines of the meeting, a broader vision was presented through formally submitted proposals. It serves as an independent contribution predicated on creating a link between research output and the government program, whereby the outcomes of study and research centers are presented to relevant ministries and institutions. This is alongside enhancing regular institutional communication between government entities and study centers, moving beyond incidental or formalistic cooperation.
Al-Nabaa Forum for Dialogue formally presented a complementary vision that includes allocating independent funding for research centers from state resources and exempting study centers and research organizations from previously mandated taxes. This constitutes an incentive to develop the non-governmental research sector, while stressing the independence and neutrality of these centers in presenting their visions away from political polarization.
The proposals also encompass supporting the infrastructure of study centers by allocating permanent headquarters and suitable halls for conferences and symposia, and completing the procedures for assigning appropriate locations for these headquarters. Additionally, the vision involves providing long-term, interest-free loans in accordance with legal provisions, and granting annual financial support for dialogue projects and programs, particularly in the fields of societal dialogue, youth empowerment, and studies and research.
The vision further includes providing logistical and technical support for major events; facilitating official, security, and logistical procedures related to hosting Iraqi and international figures and delegations; and enhancing cooperation and partnership with state institutions in implementing programs and initiatives tied to societal dialogue, studies, and research, according to jurisdictions and applicable laws.
Concluding his remarks, the Prime Minister affirmed the importance of the role played by think tanks, research, and study centers. He emphasized the government's support for them, the enhancement of communication and cooperation channels between them and state institutions, and the bolstering of their presence and expansion of their contribution in addressing the issues and challenges facing the state and society.
He confirmed that Iraq is working to de-escalate the situation in the region and contribute to addressing its crises, stemming from its role and responsibility in supporting regional security and stability. He pointed out that Iraq pursues an open foreign policy based on mutual esteem and shared interests, seeking to build long-term economic and developmental partnerships with countries of the world and major international corporations and institutions.
He explained that Iraq is currently facing exceptional economic challenges in light of the repercussions of the war in the region and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He indicated that the government continues to work on supporting and developing the private sector, viewing it as a fundamental pillar for achieving development and diversifying the economy, alongside the move toward establishing a Development Fund and continuing the implementation of the one million residential plots project and new cities.
He reiterated the significance of the role that think tanks and research centers can perform in offering solutions and remedies for the various issues surrounding the Iraqi scene. He noted the potential of study and research centers to contribute to achieving a developmental renaissance, calling for openness to successful global experiences, benefiting from them, and adapting them to align with the specificities and needs of the Iraqi reality.
Concluding Analysis
The content of the meeting reveals a structural tension between two parallel discourses held by the current Iraqi government:
First: An ambitious reformist discourse embodied in projects such as the Development Fund with its three arms.
Second: Institutional openness to study and research centers, coupled with a bleak diagnostic discourse acknowledging the depth of structural flaws, the "taxi driver" management, the bloated public workforce, the inability to industrialize, and the narrative of the undeclared blockade, even going as far as expressing overt pessimism regarding the country's future.
From a comparative perspective, this proposition intersects with a pattern noticed in other countries attempting to transition from a rentier economy toward a productive one under severe geopolitical pressure. In such situations, separating domestic economic reform from regional security variables is difficult. This is clearly evident from the synchronization of discussions regarding the budget and the Development Fund with the Strait of Hormuz file during the emergency meeting that preceded the gathering, as well as the Prime Minister's direct departure afterward to a UN platform where the regional stability file will be strongly present alongside any economic presentation.
As for the decision regarding support for study and research centers, it represents, institutionally, a positive step toward bridging a historical gap between government decision-making and independent research output in Iraq—a gap that was addressed through direct proposals to close it during this meeting.
However, the success of this trajectory will depend, as is the case with the Development Fund itself, on the extent to which it is translated into clear executive and legislative mechanisms, moving away from the nature of non-binding preliminary announcements that has characterized similar initiatives in previous years. This is the most profound challenge facing the majority of what was proposed in this meeting; it points to the distance between the magnitude of the accurate diagnosis of the crisis and the capacity of the actual institutional tools available to address it.
*Ali Al-Talqani - Head of the Board of Directors, Al-Nabaa Forum for Dialogue
