As part of its regular sessions in Baghdad, Al-Nabaa Forum for Dialogue discussed the legitimacy of secession and the establishment of regions in Iraq, with the participation of a panel of academic, political, and media figures.
This week’s panel included political affairs researcher Baqir Al-Rasheed; Mustafa Al-Nuaimi, administrative director of the Baghdadi Cultural Center and journalist; Muhammad Nawar, director of the political department at Al-Dawa newspaper; Muayyad Al-Khafaji, professor of political science at the University of Baghdad; and war correspondent Kamal Al-Musawi.
This week’s session of Al-Nabaa Forum for Dialogue was moderated by researcher and political analyst Baqir Al-Rasheed, who raised several fundamental questions through a discussion paper, including:
Concerns and apprehensions accompanying the concept of partition and secession projects.
External guarantees offered for the post-secession phase.
The parameters and premises of regional projects paving the way for secession.
The impact of secession on equal citizenship in Iraq.
Nationalism and Sectarianism in the Regions
Al-Rasheed began his intervention by noting that "the regional project is among the matters endorsed by the Iraqi Constitution, provided it is not based on nationalistic or sectarian principles." He also referenced the periodic calls made by the President of the Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani, for secession and the establishment of a Kurdish state, characterizing them as mere media slogans and rhetoric rather than a primary core objective.
He added: "Through our monitoring of Iraqi political affairs from the angle of Kurdish demands, we observe that Barzani and his ruling party are facing pressure from both within and outside the region. These pressures drive him to burnish his image through repeated calls for secession to capture the sentiments of the Kurdish people, given that a Kurdish state represents a dream for them. Masoud thus attempts to burnish his image and appeal to those emotions with the dream of an independent homeland through these propositions, even though the issue of secession currently lacks favorable conditions due to several internal and external difficulties obstructing the realization of this dream."
Al-Rasheed reviewed these obstacles, noting that internal political conflicts confront this dream due to:
Fears of authoritarian rule by a single ruler; hence, this project faced sit-ins and demonstrations at various times in recent years.
The issue of secession and the dream of a region are not purely in the hands of the Kurds as an internal political matter specific to one state or group; rather, they are managed by powers allied with the Kurds that appear outwardly as friendly nations but are in reality hostile powers, specifically the leading Western powers, Britain and America, whose stances toward resolving the Kurdish question comprehensively remain unchanged.
Al-Rasheed continued outlining his views, stating: "There are U.S. plans to re-partition the region, a proposal previously referenced under the headline of the 'Biden Plan,' categorized as a partition plan. What is happening in Iraq and Syria is part of this scheme. The expansionist mindset of Western leaders, which prevented the fathers and grandfathers of current Kurdish leaders from realizing their project, remains unchanged. The West opposes granting Iran’s Kurds any rights; in Syria, they publicly proclaim the Kurds' right to secede; and in the north, they remain silent so as not to anger Turkey. The apparent objection to the Kurdish plan is not extended to the Kurdish insurgency in Anatolia, even if they use it to pressure and blackmail the Turkish government. That is to say, the realistic picture is that if the idea of secession materializes years from now, it will not come at the expense of Turkey's interests or the concerns surrounding the dream of a Kurdish state in Iraq."
Governance as the Core of the Conflict
Intervening in the discussions, war correspondent Kamal Al-Musawi remarked: "Raising the issue of regions at the present time appears to be the straw that broke the country's national unity." During his intervention, Al-Musawi pointed out several drawbacks drawn from indicators of the secession project's failure. He continued: "Despite the compositional nature of Iraqi society as multi-sectarian and multi-ethnic, every ethnicity or sect has several internal divisions between those demanding secession and those opposing it for narrow internal interests rather than the public good. Independence is nothing more than media hype," adding that "this is due to the scale of ongoing conflicts among members of the same group, who often advocate independence."
He added: "The clearest proof that the region is unsuitable to serve as a state project, and indeed the cause behind the failure of such attempts, lies in these conflicts, as the establishment of Kurdish autonomy took place over half a century ago as a result of conflicts."
He noted that pluralism across sects and ethnicities within Kurdish society eliminated the avenue for freedom and civic participation in the project, emphasizing that "the Kurdish government suffers from the authoritarianism of its officials and the complete absence of dialogue."
Turning to the Sunni community, Al-Musawi asserted that the idea of independence for Sunni areas represents another crime added to war crimes. He noted that the secession project faces even greater difficulties and fears because western Iraq, on the Sunni side, is open to regional states. Experiences in the years following 2003 confirm the failure of Sunni parties—which lack a unified political or consistent religious leadership—to safeguard the nation's borders against foreign and regional ambitions and interventions. The entry of ISIS from the Turkish or Saudi border serves as the strongest evidence of the scale of that failure.
Al-Musawi continued by stating that the same applies to the Shiite side, which is plagued by conflicts and disagreements among its religious and political leadership. There is the movement of Sayyid Muqtada, the Supreme Council led by Sayyid Ammar Al-Hakim, the State of Law Coalition led by Al-Maliki, and those leading and supporting the policies of Haider Al-Abadi, alongside a long list of divisions preventing the establishment of a unified Shiite region. He believed that should the concept of a region be realized, conflicts would head toward infighting rather than consensus.
Seven "Failed" States Established by the Kurds
Mustafa Al-Nuaimi, administrative director of the Baghdadi Cultural Center, presented an opposing viewpoint during Al-Nabaa Forum for Dialogue, strongly supporting the idea of the Kurdistan Region's secession. He asserted that "the Kurds are a direct and indirect source of crises for the central government in Baghdad. In times of prosperity, the Kurds demand secession as if a Kurdish state enjoys external international support, whereas these are merely emotional impulses and statements lacking realistic foundations, despite the fact that Kurdish history in forming an independent state failed five times across different eras and decades worldwide." During his speech, he cited a report published by HuffPost Arabi on the failure of attempts to establish a Kurdish state, reviewing seven such attempts created by Kurds since the 20th century, all of which "ended in failure."
According to the report, recent steps were part of decades-long Kurdish efforts and attempts to achieve the dream of an independent Kurdish state, such as Syrian Kurds announcing on Thursday, March 17, 2016, the establishment of a federal system in areas under their control in northern Syria during a meeting held in the town of Rmeilan, Al-Hasakah Governorate, amid international and domestic opposition.
Meanwhile, the President of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani, called on February 3, 2017, for a "non-binding referendum" on independence, as Kurds in Iraq have demanded expanding the scope of autonomy in recent years, particularly following the takeover of areas in Iraq by ISIS.
These recent steps come within Kurdish attempts and efforts spanning decades to fulfill the dream of an independent Kurdish state, a dream whose initial seed sprouted during the Abbasid era, after Kurdish tribes attempted relative unification for the first time following their collective conversion to Islam under the leadership of feudal lords and nobles, leading to the sequential emergence of independent and semi-independent Kurdish ruling families on the stage of history.
In contemporary history, Kurds began contemplating the establishment of an independent state named Kurdistan at the beginning of the 20th century. Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the victorious Western Allies envisioned a Kurdish state in the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres. However, these hopes were dashed three years later with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which established the current borders of Turkey in a manner that precluded the existence of a Kurdish state.
As a result, Kurds remained minorities in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. Over the subsequent 80 years, any Kurdish attempt to found an independent state was crushed, yet these efforts persisted intermittently up to the present day. Below, we review the most prominent Kurdish attempts to establish their state during the past and current centuries:
Kingdom of Kurdistan (1922–1924)
The Kingdom of Kurdistan was a Kurdish kingdom founded by Sheikh Mahmud Al-Hafid Zada Barzanji in northern Iraq between October 1922 and June 1924.
The kingdom did not gain international recognition. After Barzanji proclaimed himself King of Kurdistan in November 1922, Britain dispatched a military expedition to Sulaymaniyah a few months later to strip him of his authority.
Subsequently, the central government in Baghdad mobilized military forces to end Barzanji's rule. On July 19, 1924, the Iraqi army succeeded in taking control of Sulaymaniyah, Barzanji's center of influence. Forced to abandon the city, Barzanji retreated as the Iraqi government launched another campaign, successfully neutralizing his influence in Sulaymaniyah this time. Consequently, Barzanji fled to the mountains to wage guerrilla warfare. Politically, the Iraqi government appointed a loyal Kurdish official as governor (Mutasarrif) of Sulaymaniyah Governorate, receiving orders directly from the central government in Baghdad, which temporarily restored security.
Barzanji continued his armed actions against the Iraqi government until October 1926, when he reached an agreement stipulating that he and his family would leave Iraq for Iran and abstain from interfering in political affairs in exchange for the restoration of his property.
Loss of Kurdish Rights and the 1925 Protests
Following Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's declaration of the birth of the Republic of Turkey in October 1923 and his reconciliation with the West and major powers, a new phase began for the Kurds of Turkey. The teaching of the Kurdish language was banned in schools and institutes, and Kurds were prohibited from speaking it in public streets and assemblies, as well as in government offices and courts.
In response to these new policies, the Sheikh Said Piran protests broke out in 1925, supported by Armenians, Circassians, Arabs, and Assyrians across southeastern Turkey.
This uprising ended with the arrest and execution of Sheikh Said and his companions in May 1925. Subsequently, the Ararat protests erupted in 1926 under the leadership of General Ihsan Nuri Pasha of the Ottoman army and continued until 1930, when they were likewise suppressed.
Republic of Red Kurdistan (1922–1929)
Owing to the difficult conditions faced by Kurds residing in Azerbaijan, several Kurdish figures decided to establish an autonomous region beginning on July 7, 1923, at the instigation of the former Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin.
Consequently, administrative state institutions and a parliamentary system were established in Kurdistan, and Gusi Hajiyev, a local resident, was elected as the first speaker of parliament and the first president of Soviet Kurdistan. However, it did not last long due to opposition from certain Soviet figures to any Kurdish movement that might harm relations with neighboring Turkey and Iran. Its end came in 1929, following the deportation of the Kurds from the area.
Thus, Al-Nuaimi concluded his intervention with an objective summary regarding the formation of regions: "The concept of this project is undeserving of respect as long as agreements and objectives remain personal rather than citizen-centric. A state of Iraqi Kurdistan has no future so long as individuals and personal ambitions dictate the will of the people, without considering that unity is strength while division is weakness and an invitation to external ambitions. This approach falls outside the scope of logic and geography and completely contradicts the core principles of the Kurdish people; even if it is constitutional, it remains socially rejected."
Barzani's Term and the Mandate of the Referendum
Muhammad Nawar, director of the political and cultural department at Al-Dawa newspaper, pointed out in his intervention that introducing the idea of secession at the present time is unviable and illegal, even if it has a constitutional basis. The core of the constitution mandates that, in the event of demands for secession, a popular referendum must be held under a legitimate, legal government. This condition is absent on the ground in Iraqi Kurdistan, as the public has not been presented with a secession referendum, not to mention the illegality of conducting such a referendum under Mr. Barzani as President of the Region, whose term has expired, making his continuation in power unconstitutional and a major legal violation.
Nawar added during his intervention: "If we return to the origin of the regionalism project that gained currency in the post-2003 years, we find several factors that support it and offer warring sects logical grounds for secession. For example, calls from our Sunni brothers can be viewed from a certain perspective as legitimate, given the displacement and killings faced by the Sunni community, without impugning any specific party or sect. However, the crises that befell Sunni governorates signaled to the Sunni citizen that the government is incapable of protecting them, leading them to view secession as the best means to preserve what remains, coupled with the belief that the other side rejects their partnership in the nation. Here, I refer to the issue of displacement to Baghdad and the controversy surrounding the entry of citizens from western areas due to security concerns and fears of ISIS infiltrating civilian ranks. The same applies to citizens from southern governorates; the current reality is that the prevailing perception is that a Shiite citizen cannot live in Sunni areas, as fear of ISIS and killings leads them to reject that idea. The situation is equally applicable to Kurdish citizens, who, in the eyes of both Sunnis and Shiites, do not have the right to enter Baghdad or other governorates so long as similar access is not granted to southern or western citizens within the Kurdistan Region."
Nawar concluded his speech on regions and secession at Al-Nabaa Forum by stating: "In light of the arguments presented, whether a regional project is designated as the 'Sunni Region,' the 'Western Iraq Region,' 'Anbar,' or the 'Southern Region,' the law and the constitution acknowledge these rights under the provision that Iraq is a 'federal state' with Baghdad as its capital. Accordingly, this grants every governorate, or combination of governorates, the right to request the formation of a region pursuant to specific, legitimate regulations in effect under that law and constitution, aimed at serving the interest of the citizen rather than personal agendas."
Governance of States, Not Regions
Professor of Political Science Muayyad Al-Khafaji began his intervention by reading the legal provisions guaranteeing the establishment of regions and contrasting them with federalism, summarizing them as follows:
The Iraqi Constitution explicitly states that the State of Iraq is a federal, united state whose central capital is Baghdad (which, according to the constitution, must not belong to any region).
Article (115) of the Constitution stipulates the right of any single governorate or group of governorates to request the formation of a region based on a petition presented by two-thirds of the provincial council members, or a referendum requested by one-tenth of the voters in that governorate.
Al-Khafaji stated: "We all acknowledge the constitutional and legal validity of the regional project; however, the crucial question is whether the region will uphold central authority and remain subordinate to the central government in Baghdad, or whether secession and regionalism will turn into a collection of sovereign states within a state structure, with each region having its own army and government. This would create three armies within a single state: if we take the Kurdistan Region, reality confirms the presence of the Peshmerga, which operates under its own Ministry of Peshmerga. If the southern governorates establish a Shiite region, it will have its own army, and the same applies to the western areas. We should not be surprised if entry into certain regions eventually requires a passport and visa, akin to foreign travel. Governance in this scenario would assume the character of sovereign international states rather than federal states under central rule."
He continued: "Disagreements in Iraq have become sectarian, political, and authoritarian, a reality we cannot deny or bypass through unverified notions of patriotism. Thus, despite the indisputable constitutional and legal validity of regions, they remain unviable within Iraqi society, which is divided among political parties and blocs advancing external agendas, not to mention the extent of global and regional hostility and ambitions directed at Iraq, particularly from neighboring regional states."