By Dr. Haid Haid
Syria’s transitional authorities have made notable foreign policy gains; President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government has succeeded in restoring diplomatic relations, easing sanctions, and insulating the country from the military fallout of the ongoing war in Iran.
However, recent developments expose the limits of an outward-looking stabilisation strategy. On March 19, Israeli forces launched an airstrike on government troops in Suwayda following clashes between government forces and Druze factions, demonstrating how Syria's unresolved domestic conflicts can still draw in external actors.
Rather than addressing the root causes of the Suwayda conflict through a local process, the authorities sought to resolve it through deals brokered with foreign powers. While this approach may contain escalation, it leaves underlying tensions intact. Without a credible national process to address internal divisions, Syria's transition will remain fragile and vulnerable to recurring foreign intervention.
From Battlefield to Buffer Zone: Syria now stands out in the Middle East for an unexpected reason: while neighbouring countries are increasingly drawn into the repercussions of the war on Iran, Syria has so far avoided direct involvement, remaining largely shielded from its impact.
This shift is remarkable given Syria's recent history. For more than a decade, the country served as the central arena for regional and international rivalries. Today, by contrast, it has repositioned itself as a neutral party.
This outcome is the product of effective foreign policy by the al-Sharaa government. Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, transitional authorities have recalibrated Syria’s external relations by restoring diplomatic ties, engaging regional stakeholders, and reducing the presence of armed networks aligned with foreign actors. These measures have reduced the risk of Syria slipping back into broader conflict dynamics.
President al-Sharaa articulated this during his speech following Eid prayers on March 20, noting that Syria’s shifting position reflects a more effective management of regional and international relations. In this sense, foreign policy has served as a primary pillar of the country's stabilisation effort, helping shield Syria from external shocks during a period of intense regional volatility.
Containment Without Resolution: Yet recent developments in Suwayda highlight the limits of this strategy. Violence escalated in July 2024 when Damascus deployed troops to the governorate, a move framed by the government as an effort to restore order following clashes between Druze and Bedouin groups.
Locally, however, the intervention was widely viewed as an attempt to assert central authority after months of stalled negotiations over administrative and security arrangements. Subsequent confrontations and documented abuses deepened mistrust between local stakeholders and the authorities.
Instead of addressing the drivers of the conflict through inclusive local dialogue, the authorities sought containment through top-level external agreements. Damascus agreed to a roadmap with Jordan and the United States to address the issue in September 2025, while parallel efforts intensified to limit Israeli interference.
This approach failed to resolve the crisis. Implementation of the Jordanian-American roadmap stalled after it was rejected by de facto local authorities who were excluded from negotiations. The result was a pattern of recurring tensions and periodic violence, conditions that continue to invite foreign intervention and complicate Syria’s negotiations with Israel.
The Israeli airstrikes on March 19 followed alleged clashes between Syrian government forces and a Druze armed group. Israel framed its attack as an effort to protect the Druze community, despite Damascus condemning what it termed "intervention in internal affairs aimed at undermining security and stability."
Regardless of disputed motives, what remains clear is Israel’s readiness to intervene whenever Syria's local conflicts intersect with its strategic priorities. Consequently, no amount of Syrian diplomatic balancing can fully shield the country if domestic conflicts remain unresolved.
Postponing Dialogue: Crucially, the core issues of the Suwayda conflict are not isolated local exceptions; issues of governance, security, representation, power-sharing, and state identity are national in scope. Addressing them through closed-door bargains, whether with local elites or foreign actors, risks producing outcomes that lack legitimacy and durability.
This is where Syria’s stalled national dialogue becomes central. Launched in February 2025, the process was intended to provide a platform to tackle these exact questions. Instead, it was rushed, narrowly structured, and insufficiently consultative.
More than a year later, its outcomes remain largely unpublished. Beyond public statements, Syrians still lack a clear account of what was discussed, what priorities emerged, or what conclusions were reached. The result is not merely a missed opportunity but a widening gulf between the transitional authorities and society.
A Path Toward Consensus: Without a comprehensive national framework, Syrian political actors will continue to treat negotiations as a zero-sum game, where compromise is viewed as a loss rather than a path to shared stability. Reversing this dynamic requires broadening participation beyond political elites to include civil society, displaced communities, refugees, and the diaspora.
Even if an earlier opportunity to launch a credible national dialogue was lost, it is not too late to try again. A renewed process could provide a peaceful avenue to address the foundational questions facing the emerging state. Conducted transparently and inclusively, it could help build a national consensus and prevent negotiating parties with narrow agendas from claiming to speak for their constituencies.
Substance will be critical. Any renewed dialogue must confront the issues that continue to fuel conflict: governance, power-sharing, participation, justice, economic reform, and the role of security institutions. These are not technical matters; they lie at the heart of Syria’s future political system.
The mechanics of the process are equally vital. Consultations must be linked to outcomes, with clear mechanisms to translate agreements into policy. Transparency is essential; without a clear understanding of how decisions are made, trust cannot be rebuilt.
The most immediate step is also the simplest: publishing the results of the previous dialogue. Doing so would signal serious intent, restore credibility, and pave the way for a more meaningful and inclusive process.
The Real Test: Syria’s foreign policy success has been significant, but external positioning alone cannot guarantee stability. A transition built primarily on international positioning rather than internal cohesion remains inherently fragile. Lasting stability depends on the state’s ability to resolve domestic disputes, build a shared national vision, and establish a political order that commands legitimacy across its diverse social fabric.
Without this foundation, domestic tensions will persist, bringing repeated opportunities for external actors to intervene and undermine sovereignty. In this sense, Syria’s greatest vulnerability lies not along its borders, but within them.
The true test of the transition, therefore, lies not in its ability to navigate regional conflict, but in its capacity to build internal foundations strong enough to withstand it.
Chatham House